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Abstract 
This paper analyses the effects of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on gross transfers over time 
and across regions. Depending on the type of instrumentation to support agriculture, the volatility of 
gross transfers differs. While assistance arising from market price supports, regarded as independent 
from the world market levels, fluctuates intertemporally, direct payments are constant. Empirical 
findings for the CAP show a reduction of the transfer volatility on grain markets. For beef and veal 
this effect is not significant, because price support is still large in these markets. If agricultural 
support is biased in favour of specific commodities, territorial heterogeneity leads to an uneven 
distribution. By applying a regionalised concept of producer support estimates (PSEs) for the German 
Federal States, results indicate significant interregional variation of CAP support. 
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Since its inception in the 1960s, the CAP had experienced merely small changes for decades. Market 
price support was the main policy measure to subsidise domestic agriculture. Assistance was not equal 
across commodities, but some gained more than others. Due to increasing budgetary costs and trade 
negotiations within the GATT, the CAP had to change. In 1992, the so-called McSharry reform shifted 
partially the CAP instrumentation from market price support towards direct payments. Despite this, 
market price support remained the most important device to subsidise agricultural producers. Besides, 
direct payments were ‘coupled’, because they were related to what a farmer produces
1. Thus, the 
production of specific products was further subsidised. The Agenda 2000 reform deepened the 
McSharry reform and moved more toward direct payments in 1999. Even with the reforms in 1992 
and 1999, the CAP has still distorted the agricultural output mix and production. Although market 
price support was reduced 
significantly by the CAP reforms, it 
is still EU’s major instrumentation 
to subsidise domestic farmers. As 
the leftside of Table 1 indicates, 
more than half of the assistance to 
agricultural producers is related to 
market price support. Direct 
payments based on area planted or 
animal numbers have become 
increasingly important. Today they 
account for more than one quarter 
of total support. The rightside of 
Table 1 shows the distribution of 
CAP support across key 
commodities. The percentage PSE, 
as measured by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is the ratio 
between total transfers and the total value of production including transfers. It points out that EU 
agricultural support is biased in favour of some commodities. 
Table 1: Agricultural support within the European Union 
  
   
Composition 
  Distribution 
  1986-88
a 2001-03
b   % PSE
c in 2001-03 
Market Price Support  86.0%  56.8%   Beef and veal  74
Payments based on       Sugar  56
 input used  5.2%  7.7%   Sheepmeat  53
 output  5.2%  3.7%   Milk  47
 area planted/animal numbers  2.8%  27.3%   Wheat  45
 input constraints  0.7%  4.0%   Poultry  37
 historical entitlements  0.0%  0.6%   Oilseeds  36
 overall farming income  0.0%  0.0%   Pigmeat  22
a 1986-1988 EU-12, 
b 2001-2003 EU-15, 
c Producer Support estimate 
 
Source: OECD (2004), Author’s calculations. 
                                                 
1 Following the definitions of Cahill (1993, pp. 2-3), these payments were partially decoupled, because 
production is less than that would occur if market price support is granted, but greater than what would occur 
without policy measures. If direct payments do not affect production, the policy measure is fully decoupled. 
  1With its reform in 2003 the CAP continued to abandon price support and further shifted towards 
direct payments. Since the beginning of 2005 ‘decoupled’ direct payments have come into operation 
and have mostly replaced the former direct payment scheme. Henceforth, the amount of direct 
payments a farmer obtains is based on payments he received in the reference period 2000 to 2002. 
Referring to the OECD classification in Table 1, gross transfers arising from historical entitlements 
will increase significantly within the next years, due to the conversion of the previously ‘coupled’ 
direct payments based on area planted or animal numbers. 
Within the last decade, numerous studies examined the impacts of the changing CAP, using various 
modelling approaches
2. In doing so, mainly the effects on production were analysed while few studies 
have focused on intertemporal and interregional effects of gross transfers. A good overview of work 
relating to redistributive implications of the CAP can be found in Anders et al. (2004). Nevertheless, 
two studies shall be particularly highlighted. Tarditi and Zanias (2001) investigate territorial and social 
income redistribution for the time-period 1989-95 by pooling sixty-nine large regions (NUTS 1
3). 
Their analysis distinguishes between alternative policy measures, including market price support as 
well as ‘coupled‘ and ‘decoupled’ direct payments. They conclude that so far the CAP has transferred 
income from richer urbanized regions towards poorer regions and agricultural support has been 
positively correlated to the economic size of farms. A report of the European Spatial Planning 
Observation Network (ESPON) programme (ESPON 2004) aims at analysing the territorial impacts of 
the CAP and rural development policies at the NUTS 3 level within the EU. Results indicate that total 
CAP Pillar 1 support is not targeted at cohesion and corresponding to Tarditi and Zanias (2001) 
largely proportional to average farm business size. The report infers that information on the regional 
and territorial dimension of the CAP is still poorly developed and further research is required. 
Taking up that position, one objective of this paper is to analyse interregional CAP effects across the 
German Federal States. Because they are characterised by a large heterogeneity in view of their 
agricultural structure, identifying the regional dimension of the CAP is of particular interest. While the 
newly-formed German states are dominated by large-scale farming and crop production, the old states 
show diversified land coverage and farm sizes. A regionalised PSE approach suggested by Anders et 
al. (2004) appears to be a useful construct in examining territorial distribution of CAP support. Apart 
from the interregional dimension, this paper analyses intertemporal effects of the changing CAP on 
gross transfers and examines whether product specific support tends to become more stable over time. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section two discusses theoretically the intertemporal and 
interregional implications of changing agricultural policy measures with a special view on CAP 
reforms. It derives two hypotheses in view of CAP support over time and across regions. Section three 
describes the methodology of measurement and the data used for analysis. The paper then tests the 
hypotheses developed in section four and presents empirical results. Concluding remarks are offered in 
the final section. 
 
 
2. Hypotheses  for  intertemporal  and interregional CAP support  
 
This section develops two hypotheses in view of the changing CAP. While first intertemporal effects 
on gross transfers are examined, the second part deals with interregional effects. 
Depending on the farm program to support agricultural producers gross transfers show different 
intertemporal volatilities. For purposes of this section, agricultural policy instruments are divided into 
two categories, market price supports and direct payments. According to the price-support policy of 
the EU, fixing domestic prices is regarded as independent from the world market price. Direct 
payments are viewed as lump-transfers and constant over time. Consider that farmers can be supported 
either by instruments of the first group, by instruments of the second group or by a combination of 
them. In algebraic form gross transfers GT to agriculture are shown in the upper part of Table 2, where 
                                                 
2 For a recent review of literature in this field see Andersson (2004). An overview over the main modelling 
approaches is given in Salvatici et al. (2000). Intertemporal aspects of policies on income are analysed in 
Newbery and Stiglitz (1981). 
3 The nomenclature of units for territorial statistics (NUTS) was introduced by the EU. It provides a hierarchical 
classification of the Member States territories. 
  2Pd denotes the domestic price, Pw is the world price, Qd is the level of domestic production and D are 
direct payments. Table 2 gives three different policy scenarios. Scenario 1 assumes that gross transfers 
arise only from market price supports. In scenario 2 assistance to farmers consists half of market price 
support and half of direct payments. And finally, in scenario 3 gross transfers result only from direct 
payments. 
 
Table 2: Hypothetical compositions of policy measures to support agriculture 
 
Gross transfers    Market Price support    Quantity produced    Direct payments 
GT  =  (Pd – Pw)  *  Q  +  D 
Scenario 1    100 %    constant    0 % 
Scenario 2    50 %    constant    50 % 
Scenario 3    0 %    constant    100 % 
Source: Author’s presentation. 
 
Assuming a fixed quantity produced, with market price supports, the value of transfers depends on the 
level of world prices. Hence, due to price volatility on world markets support levels vary over time. By 
moving from market price supports towards direct payments, transfers become more stable as a result 
of the lump-sum payments. If support arises only from direct payments, transfers do not fluctuate. 
Figure 1 gives a graphic representation of the different effects on gross transfers arising from the 
previously mentioned policy scenarios. While on the left-hand vertical axis the value of transfers is 
plotted, the x-axis depicts time. Starting from scenario 1 this paper assumes that world prices are 
volatile. Gross transfers based on market price supports also fluctuate, but inversely to international 
prices. If world prices are high, support to producers is smaller than with lower international prices. As 
indicated in Table 2 scenario 2 assumes gross transfers arise half from market price supports and half 
from direct payments. Figure 1 shows the resulting volatility of gross transfers is reduced. Scenario 3 















Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 1: Intertemporal effects of agricultural policy measures on gross transfers 
 
For grain as well as beef and veal markets, the CAP shifted partially from market price supports 
towards direct payments. Following the aforementioned considerations, it is hypothesized that the 
volatility of transfers has reduced on these markets due to the CAP reforms. 
  3Turning away from intertemporal to interregional effects of the CAP, the crux of the matter is that 
support was and still is distributed unevenly across commodities. While some receive large assistance, 
others receive less or no support. This implies that subject to the type of farming within regions, gross 
transfers arising from the CAP differ. Additionally, the imbalanced support between commodities has 
effects on the output mix within regions. If selected products in a market receive subsidies while 
others do not, the production is distorted. 
This argument can be clarified utilising as a basic economic tool, the production possibility frontier 
(PPF). It describes the possible combinations of maximum output that can be attained for a given set 
of inputs. The optimal output mix is obtained by maximising total revenue. Suppose the agricultural 
output of a country or region is divided into two groups, where Q1 and Q2 denote the vectors of 




Source: Author’s presentation. 
Q2 
 
Figure 2: CAP effects on output mix 
 
To identify the revenue maximising output mix an iso-revenue function is derived which is defined as 
the sum of partial revenue accruing from each output. It is assumed that total revenue is a function of 
Q1 and Q2 and its corresponding price vectors P1 and P2
5. First suppose the agricultural market of the 
country under consideration faces world prices and no governmental support is granted. The iso-
revenue function is given as IRF  in Figure 2. At that point where the iso-revenue function is tangent 
to the PPF, the optimal output mix is obtained (cf. Koester 1992, p. 82). The optimal combination of 
output is given at Q
FT




1 1 t 2
2 t
 will also change the price ratio and distort the output mix. 
FT and Q
FT. Suppose now the country under consideration introduces market 
price support for Q  while Q  continues to face world prices. Since the slope of an iso-revenue 
function is defined as the price ratio of Q  and Q  the iso-revenue function will turn. Here, the slope of 
the iso-revenue function is –(P /P ) and thus, if P  is increased, IRF  will turn clockwise resulting in a 




 increases output to Q
MPS. Because the set of inputs is given, output of Q  decreases to 
Q
MPS. Figure 2 shows that policy measures which change the price ratio between commodities result 
in a distortion of output. For illustration, it was assumed that the policy measure under consideration is 
market price support. However, it can be shown that each policy measure which changes ‘effective 
prices’
6
In the long run, the bias in output mix will likely increase, because the PPF begins to distort apart 
from the turn of the iso-revenue function. In general, the PPF shifts outward over time due to technical 
                                                 
4 Neoclassical production theory is assumed. 
5 In algebraic form the iso-revenue function is defined as  2 2 1 1 P * Q P * Q R + =  where P1 and P2 are the vectors 
of output prices for Q1 and Q2, respectively. Rewriting this expression yields Q 1 2 1 2 2 Q * ) P / P ( ) P / R ( − = . With 
an increasing distance of the iso-revenue function from the origin, revenue increases also. 
6 The term ‘effective price’ refers to an article by Jongeneel (2003, p. 316) who proposes a method for 




















j = Quantity of products in group i under scenario j 
PPF = Production  possibility  frontier 
IRF = Iso-revenue  function 
FT = Free  trade 
MPS  = Market price support 








  4progress. If some commodities are supported in a market and their profitability is increased, more 
emphasis is put on technical progress in these products. Thus, the PPF shifts outward unevenly, i.e. 
there is a bias towards the production of subsidised commodities. The long run PPF is given as PPFt+1. 
It shows that in period t+1 quantity of Q1 increases to Q1
MPS




As regions differ in view of site-related factors
7, their PPFs differ also in curvature and extension 
from the origin. Through this, the agricultural output mix shows large heterogeneity across regions. If 
agricultural policy measures, regardless of their nature, are imbalanced between commodities some 
regions receive more subsidies than others. Hence, ‘coupled’ direct payments do not reduce the 
heterogeneous territorial incidence of agricultural support, compared to market price support. 
 
 
3. Methodology  of  measurement 
 
This paper adapts the OECD definition for gross transfers to support agricultural producers, namely 
the PSE. Since 1986 the OECD derives annually several indicators to measure agricultural assistance 
within its member states. This allows for a comparison of impacts of agricultural policies across 
countries, but regional effects remain hidden. Following Anders et al (2004), this paper applies a top-
down procedure to analyse gross transfers over time and across regions. Utilizing OECD’s PSE at the 
EU level, this paper regionalises agricultural support down to the NUTS 1 level
8. The OECD’s 
absolute PSE measures the annual monetary value of transfers, both from taxpayers and consumers to 
support agricultural producers (OECD 1990). Therefore, the PSE is an aggregate measure consisting 
of various instrumentations regardless of their nature. In algebraic form the absolute PSE is defined as: 
(1)  B L D Q * ) P P ( PSE d w d + − + − =  
where Pd , Pw , Qd and D are denoted as aforementioned in section two, L are levies on producers and 
B includes all other forms of budgetary-financed support. To evaluate the amount of transfers per unit 






PSE = . 
To derive agricultural support flows for a disaggregated regional level, Equation (2) is the starting 
point. By multiplying the unit PSE and the quantity supplied within a specific region, its total amount 
of agricultural support can be calculated: 










where superscript R denotes the region under consideration. Applying Equation (3), this paper 
estimates gross transfers arising from agricultural policies for thirteen German Federal States
9. The 
analysis covers the period from 1986 to 2003. Moreover, the dataset employed in this paper has been 
obtained from the Zentrale Markt- und Preisberichtsstelle and the Statistical Yearbook for the Federal 
Republic of Germany. PSEs per region are derived from a total of nine commodities, that account for 
almost 75 per cent of EU agricultural support. Appendix I shows the commodities and regions under 
consideration. The OECD lists the commodities wool and eggs as well as the aggregate ‘other 
commodities’, additionally. As the data for eggs or wool produced are not available at the level of the 
Federal States, these products are not considered in the analysis. However, eggs and wool account for 
a relatively small portion of total PSE. The regionalised concept of PSEs is summarised in Figure 3. 
 
                                                 
7 Here, site-related factors denote a wider definition beyond natural conditions alone (e.g. slope of the land, 
temperature, and available water capacity of the soil) factors like the average farm and field size. 
8 Alternatively a bottom-up approach is possible. This implicates large and consistent data on the regional level 
which is often poor. An application of this approach can be found in the EPSON report (2004, pp. 68-88). 
9 Due to lack of data, the three city states Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg are not accounted for. 
  5 
Source: Author’s presentation. 
Procedure  PSE measure 
Calculating unit PSEs for the EU by dividing absolute PSE 
per product and the quantity supplied. 
Deriving regional absolute PSEs per product by multiplying 
unit PSE and the quantity supplied within a region. 
Taking annual monetary values of gross CAP transfers 
to EU farmers in terms of OECD’s PSEs. 
EU’s absolute 
PSE per commodity 
Step 1 




PSE per commodity 
Step 3 
Adding up each PSE per product within a region 





Figure 3: Regionalisation of the PSE indicator 
 
The method of regionalisation can be viewed as a four-step-top-down procedure starting from the 
EU’s absolute PSE. Because the OECD lists in its annual report absolute PSEs per commodity for a 
range of key products, it is possible to calculate unit PSEs. In the third step these unit PSEs are 
multiplied by the quantities supplied within the region under consideration. Adding up each of these 
PSEs per product, results in an indicator of CAP gross transfers into a region. To compare these values 
across regions with different sizes, three different basic units were taken. As indicated in Table 3, the 
level of support is calculated per hectare (Equation (4)), per agricultural labour (Equation (5)) and per 
farm (Equation (6)) where A
R is the agriculturally used area, L
R is the number of agricultural labour 
and F
R is the number of farms within the region under consideration. 
 























PSE =  
Source: Author’s presentation. 
 
 
4. Empirical  Results 
 
The data in this analysis covers the period from 1986 to 2003. Therefore, it refers to both, the 
‘traditional’ CAP, relying heavily on market price support, as well as the ‘new’ CAP with gross 
transfers partly based on direct payments. As section two indicates, it is assumed that the changes in 
EU agricultural markets have reduced support volatility over time. In this regard, the central aspects of 
the CAP reforms in 1992 and 1999 affect the markets for grains and beef. Support prices were cut to 
some degree (by a total of 50 and 35 per cent for grain and beef, respectively) while ‘coupled’ direct 
payments were launched to compensate for price reduction. To test whether this new instrumentation 
already stabilises gross transfers to EU farmers’ product specific support on a per unit basis is derived. 
By utilising Equation (2), unit PSEs for wheat, ‘other grains’ as well as the product category beef and 
veal are calculated. That followed, the sample is split into two subgroups, characterising one period 
where gross transfers arise almost solely from market price support, and on the other hand one period 
where besides to price support, direct payments were granted. Descriptive statistics for the period from 
1986 to 2003 are presented in Table 4. It shows total CAP support per ton for wheat, other grains as 
  6well as beef and veal, expressed as unit PSEs. On average, the total value of transfers per ton of wheat 
produced is 105.30 Euro, whereas other grains receive a total value of 82.43 Euros per ton. This 
indicates biased support and distorts grain markets. The total value of transfers to beef and veal is on 
average 2207.75 Euros per ton. Besides, Table 4 lists the minimum and maximum values of the unit 
PSEs. There exists a large range for agricultural support per ton of the commodity produced. The main 
reason for this volatility in gross transfers is due to its large portion relying on market price support. 
The dispersion of gross transfers per unit expressed as the coefficient of variation is almost four 
percentage points higher for wheat than for other grains. Similar to wheat the unit PSEs for beef and 
veal disperse about 20 per cent relative to its mean. 
 
Table 4: Unit PSEs for selected agricultural commodities for the period from 1986 to 2003
a
 
    Wheat  Other grains  Beef and veal 
  Mean  105.30  82.43  2207.75 
  Range  53.82 - 138.02  52.22 – 104.22  1463.83 - 3106.40 
  Coefficient of Variation  20.5 %  17 %  21.8 % 
 
a in Euros per ton       
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Because the McSharry reform was fully implemented in 1996, the given time series is divided at that 
year
10. That is the period from 1986 to 1996 characterises the ‘traditional’ CAP while subsequent 
years refer to the ‘new’ CAP. Descriptive statistics indicate that for all three commodities the variance 
in unit PSEs is larger for the traditional CAP than for the new CAP. This supports the hypothesis of a 
reduced volatility in gross transfers. To test for variance equality an F-statistic is derived. The 
condition of normal distribution for the subgroups is satisfied. The F-test tests the null hypothesis that 
the variances in both subgroups are equal. The alternative hypothesis is that the variance of unit PSEs 








where   denote the variance of that period with the larger variance and   with the smaller, 
respectively. Table 5 presents the results of the F-statistics. It shows that for wheat and other grains the 
variance of the unit PSEs is significantly larger for the period of the traditional CAP than for the 
period of the new CAP. However, for beef and veal the null hypothesis can not be rejected. This 







Table 5: F-statistics for testing variance equality between unit PSEs arising from different policy 
measures 
 
    Wheat  Other grains  Beef and veal 
  F-statistic  9.07**  5.48*  2.32 
  ** ( * ) Statistically significant at the 99 % (95 %) level. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
                                                 
10 This split is somewhat arbitrary and could have taken place earlier. It is possible to trisect the sample and 
analyse the effects for the ‘pre McSharry period’, the ‘post McSharry period’ as well as the ‘post Agenda 2000 
period’. However, trisecting would lead to small subsamples. 
  7The hypothesis of reduced support volatility due to the changes on EU agricultural markets holds for 
grain, but not for beef and veal markets. This is consistent with the fact that the CAP reforms draw 
domestic grain prices nearer to world market levels than domestic prices for beef and veal. 
The second hypothesis developed in this paper states, that due to its heavy weight on some products, 
CAP support differs in its territorial incidence. To test for this, gross transfers arising from EU 
agricultural support are calculated for the German Federal States. The regions under consideration 
show major differences in their agricultural structure. E.g. the newly formed German states in the east 
are dominated by large scale farming. On the contrary, the regions in the south-western part of 
Germany show small-scale farming. In the north-western regions medium-scale farming can be found. 
In view of output mix, the newly formed German states are dominated by crop production, whereas 
the old West German states are heterogeneous. Figure 4 identifies the large variety within the regions 
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22  24 198 30 258 46  28  24  43 112 236 53 157 Average farm size 
(in hectare) 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from the Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany. 
 
Figure 4: Share of different farming systems within the German Federal States in 2001
11
 
The abbreviations of the regions can be found in Appendix I. Figure 4 shall not be discussed in detail, 
but indicating the range, farm types differ across German regions. Aside from the farming systems, it 
also shows the average farm size for the regions under consideration. It ranges from 22 to 258 hectare 
while significant differences exist between the old West German states and the former GDR states. As 
a result, economies of scale are at variance and average costs differ across regions. 
This paper takes support per hectare, per agricultural labour unit and per farm as units for analysis. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of gross transfers to agriculture arising from the CAP. It points out 
different levels of support across regions. In Germany CAP support per hectare varies from about 400 
to more than 1300 Euros per hectare, indicating a large territorial dispersion. Large support levels per 
hectare occur in the north-west and south of Germany. Referring to acreage, livestock products receive 
higher levels of support in comparison to crops. As a result, regions with high livestock densities, e.g. 
cattle, receive larger gross transfers per hectare than regions with smaller livestock densities. 
Significant correlation coefficients were found between support levels per hectare and cattle per 
hectare as well as milk production per hectare (at the 99.9 and 99 per cent level, respectively). 
However, a significant negative correlation coefficient was found between support levels per hectare 
and average farm sizes across the regions (at the 95 per cent level). This supports the observation that 
on smaller farms mainly the production of cattle and milk dominates. 
Gross transfers per agricultural labour unit are shown in the middle map of Figure 5. Per labour unit, 
CAP support within Germany spreads from 3500 Euros to more than 28000 Euros. Higher levels of 
support per agricultural labour unit seem to be proportional to regions with larger farm sizes, 
                                                 
11 The thirteen regions are listed in alphabetical order. 
  8indicating a significant correlation (at the 99.9 per cent level). Thus, particularly in the newly formed 
German states the PSE per agricultural labour unit is high. But also the regions with medium-scale 
farming tend to receive higher levels of gross transfers per labour unit. 
 
Gross transfers per hectare 
of agricultural land 
Gross transfers per 
agricultural labour unit 
Gross transfers 
per farm 
More than 1300 
400 to 600 
600 to 900 
900 to 1300 
No data 
More than 28000 
3500 to 8000 
8000 to 18000 
18000 to 28000 
No data 
More than 150000 
15000 to 25000 
25000 to 65000 
65000 to 150000 
No data 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from OECD, various issues, Zentrale Markt- und Preisberichtsstelle, 
various issues and the Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany. 
 
Figure 5: Gross transfers to German agricultural producers in 2003 (Euro) 
 
The map on the right hand side of Figure 5 shows gross transfers per farm. It ranges from 15000 
Euros, in regions located in the south-western part of Germany, to more than 150000 Euros in the 
newly formed German states. Gross transfers per farm are highly associated to its economic size and 
significant correlation was found (at the 99.9 per cent level). In sum, Figure 5 indicates the different 
incidence of gross transfers across the regions under consideration. However, depending on the unit 
support is measured, gross transfers vary. Table 6 shows the coefficients of correlation between the 
different measures of support, utilised in this paper. 
 
Table 6: Correlation between measures of gross transfer 
 
   PSE 
per hectare 
PSE 
per agricultural labour unit 
PSE 
per farm 
   PSE per hectare  1.00  0.07  -0.26 
   PSE per agricultural labour unit    1.00  0.91*** 
   PSE per farm      1.00 
*** Statistically significant at the 99.9 per cent level. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
While gross transfers per hectare is not correlated to the other indicators, there exists a significant 
correlation between gross transfers per agricultural labour unit and per farm. 
  9The analysis above shows significant heterogeneity in view of the gross transfers arising from the 
CAP. While some regions are beneficiaries in view of support per hectare, they can be at disadvantage 
e.g. in view of support per labour. But, some regions in the mid-western part of Germany receive 
small transfers, independent from how support is measured. In Appendix II the regions are ranked 
according to their gross transfers per hectare, per agricultural labour unit and per farm. Due to the 
heavyweight on specific commodities, some regions with a large livestock density receive more 
support on a per hectare basis than others. On the other hand, regions dominated by large-scale and/or 





The paper has explored two issues relating to intertemporal and interregional impacts of the changing 
EU agricultural policy. First, the intertemporal incidence of gross transfers arising either from price 
supports or direct payments was analysed. The empirical results appear reasonable and indicate a 
reducing volatility of CAP support over time for grain markets. Because price support in meat markets 
is still large, the dispersion of support for beef and veal has not been affected significantly. Second, 
this paper identified the uneven distribution of CAP support across regions. However, these results 
depend largely on the indicator of support. Assistance per hectare is proportional to cattle density and 
milk production within a region. Assistance per agricultural labour unit is associated with the 
economic size of farms. Between the two measures ‘support levels per farm’ and ‘support levels per 
agricultural labour unit’, significant correlation was found. Germany shows large gross transfers per 
farm and per agricultural worker in its newly formed states. These regions are characterised by large-
scale farming with a focus on crop production. Support levels per hectare are large in the north-west 
and south of Germany where cattle densities and milk production are high. 
The fundamental changes of the CAP in 2003 will again affect the distribution of gross transfers. By 
a further abandonment of market price supports and replacing the former direct payments with a single 
payment based on historical reference, CAP support tends to become less volatile in the future. In 
view of the regional distribution of gross transfers, the CAP reform of 2003 will have different effects, 
depending on which model is implemented at the national level. While the ‘standard model’ is more 
likely to maintain the current distribution of gross transfers, the ‘regional model’ has redistributive 
effects. 
Finally, the limitations of this analysis must be stressed. This paper focussed on the intertemporal 
and interregional incidence of the changing CAP on gross transfers. In doing so, the effects on 
farmers’ revenue or income remain hidden. To account for them would be a much more complicated 
task and is far beyond the scope of this article. Further research is encouraged to address these issues. 
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Appendix I: List of regions and product variables 
 
 Regions  Product  variables     
1 Baden-Württemberg  (BW)  1 Wheat     
2  Bayern (BY)  2 Other grains including     
3  Brandenburg (BB)    Triticale     
4  Hessen (HE)    Maize     
5  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MV)    Rye     
6  Niedersachsen (NI)    Oats     
7  Nordrhein-Westfalen (NW)    Barley     
8 Rheinland-Pfalz  (RP)  4 Rapeseed     
9  Saarland (SL)  5 Sugar Beets     
10 Sachsen  (SN)  6 Milk     
11  Sachsen-Anhalt (ST)  7 Beef and Veal     
12 Schleswig-Holstein  (SH)  8 Sheepmeat     
13  Thüringen (TH)  9 Pigmeat Poultry     
 
 
APPENDIX II: Regions’ rank according to different indicators of gross transfers 
 
  BW  BY  BB  HE  MV  NI  NW  RP  SL  SN  ST  SH  TH 
Rank according to                           
   PSE per hectare  5  4  13  7  8  3  1  11  12  10  9  2  6 
   PSE per labour  12  9  7  11  1  5  6  13  10  8  2  3  4 
   PSE per farm  10  9  4  11  1  7  8  13  12  5  2  6  3 
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